Impact of Qing Imperial Expansion on China (1700–1900)

In the last year, nothing in the Dzungar war has turned out as we expected. Painfully, I reflect on my responsibility, and I find that we, ruler and minister, have brought all the blame on ourselves. Military strategists say: Those who show force arrogantly will lose, those who deceive themselves about the strength of the enemy will lose, those who do not know the enemy well will lose. Our army has committed all three of these mistakes. I regret this endlessly—I confess my sins to Heaven and try to atone for my crimes. The enemy’s power has been far beyond what I had known or expected. Who knows when our armies will be strong enough to allow me to wipe away this shame and take revenge? For now, the focus should be to regroup and seek Heaven’s forgiveness. We certainly can no longer think of advancing on and annihilating the enemy. . . .

Emphasize careful defense; absolutely do not advance the troops rashly. Hold fast to the remaining forts and garrisons and look at the larger picture. Only attack if you see a completely safe opportunity to do so. Then, if Heaven grants us victory and the enemy flees, take care not to pursue him over a long distance. Why? Because out there in the enemy’s home territory, we are at a disadvantage. Do not leave the fortified cities for more than a hundred miles or so before having the troops return. We are not cowards, but we must stay calm and avoid overreacting to these recent defeats.

If we follow the wishes of the Chinese and accept their authority, we will end up imprisoned in Beijing. Our ancestors have lived under the control of others for centuries. Now, by chance, the powerful Dzungar state that was our main enemy has collapsed, and, for the moment, no one is pressing on us. If we do not seize this opportunity to create an independent state, we shall be slaves forever. The Middle Kingdom [China] has now taken the Dzungar Khanate but has not yet decided its policy toward our region. Its troops cannot come here because we are so far from the center of their power, and if they do come, we will resist them until their supplies are exhausted.

The [Tibetan] region of Batang was previously under the rule of the [Mongol] ruler Lha-bzang Khan. But, in 1718, the [Qing] General Wen Pu led an army into Batang, where he proclaimed the rule and virtue of the sacred dynasty. . . . At that time, the Batang civil officials, headmen, monks, and local people welcomed the Qing armies. With full hearts they offered their allegiance and were willing to become children of the heavenly dynasty.

This region currently includes thirty-three villages, thirty-nine headmen, 6,920 local households, and 2,110 monks. Annually, they submit grain taxes, provide forced labor services, and transport military rations and salaries. . . . Since 1729, the towns and villages of this region have been governed by appointed [Qing] officials and by deputy local officials whose positions are usually inherited within local leading families. . . . Yet, over the years, the population of the region has declined. To take but two examples—in the village of Ciung-tui there were more than fifty families in the past, but now only eight families remain; yet taxes continue to be demanded yearly according to the number of original families. Likewise, in the tax district of Sera, there originally lived more than a thousand families; today, less than 300 families are left, yet taxes continue to be assessed according to the old number of inhabitants. Because this happens in all districts, the people are left in a state they cannot endure.

His Majesty always emphasized the importance of acting economically in his personal expenditure and did everything he could to reduce spending related to the imperial court. When ascending to the throne [in 1735], he ordered for example that the celebrations must not include the placing of any gold or silver decorations on city streets and markets. Several times during his reign, the emperor also cut the budget of the Imperial Kitchens, so that their annual expenditure was only slightly more than 20,000 liang.* Many of his attendants complained money was not sufficient for the needs of the palace, but their pleas for more funds went unheard.

Yet when large sums were meant to be spent for the sake of the people and the country, the emperor did not show such a tendency to economize. The wars of expansion in the west and in the south, for example, cost more than 100 million liang. . . . Between 1771 and 1796, he waived on four occasions the annual tribute of grain owed by some of the outlying provinces. Each time this amounted to a loss of a billion liang in revenue, yet his Majesty never gave in to the calls of stingy officials to end such tribute waivers.

*Qing currency unit

Once the revolt started, the Manchu [Qing] troops, having lived in cities for a hundred years, lost all their martial spirit and were physically weakened so much that they could not even pull their bows; the arrows they shot did not go far and could not penetrate the thickly quilted clothes of the Muslim rebels. The Manchu officials had neglected teaching their soldiers how to use their weapons. In the battle with the Muslims, the bulky clothes of the Qing soldiers hampered their movements. On top of this, the soldiers themselves were starving since they had not been properly provisioned with food for a long time. Their horses were also weakened because the garrison had not been getting horse feed deliveries. As a result, the horses could not gallop in deep snow. The Muslim rebels eventually caught the Manchus stuck in snow and killed them.

The Manchu officials did not care for the soldiers and the solders, in return, held the officials in contempt. When the rebellion broke out, they did not attempt to repress it bravely. Instead, at the sight of the rebels, they ran away. They worried about preserving their own lives and neglected to protect even their own wives and daughters from falling into the hands of the rebels. They were so pitiful!

The recent Japanese activities in Taiwan* have been a source of great concern. . . Even though Taiwan has been under our rule for over a century, Chinese officials only govern one-third of the island, mainly the coastal plains. The rest is all native [Taiwanese] territory—particularly the central mountains, where the Taiwanese people live their lives completely outside government control. . . .

To open the mountains and bring the natives under imperial control, we need to station soldiers, cut through forests, burn wild grassland, build waterways, etc. We should encourage Han [Chinese] settlement by providing settlers with livestock and seeds, helping them establish villages and fortified cities. To better establish commerce in these newly developed regions, we should appoint tax officials and set up postal communications and government buildings. All of these policies must be implemented in order.

To bring the locals under control, we need to select tribal leaders loyal to China, survey the population and land, translate their languages, teach them better farming practices, build roads, supply tea and salt, change their mode of dress, set up schools for local children and revise their customs. All these efforts must be carried out simultaneously.

*in 1874 Japan sent a naval force to Qing-controlled Taiwan to punish native Taiwanese peoples for attacking the crew of a Japanese fishing vessel that had been shipwrecked in Taiwan.