Period 4 SAQs

In the aftermath of World War I, Japanese imperialism came to be rethought radically in the context of pan-Asianism, the new discourse of civilization that began at the time to burgeon in Japan and many other parts of [Asia]. Pan-Asianism meant different things to different people, even within Japan. There were those . . . who saw the Japanese role in pan-Asianism as nondomineering—oriented toward solidarity and the revival of Asia. [For others] pan-Asianism called for a final war between the West and the East led by Japan, which had amply demonstrated its leadership abilities. Pan-Asianism also had a special meaning for Japanese nationalists and thinkers during the 1920s because of the growing perception that, despite Japan's effort to become a world-class nation-state . . . , the Japanese continued to encounter racism and discrimination.

Discrimination was perceived in the international conferences in Washington (1922), the London Naval Conference (1930), and wherever Japan was allotted a lower quota of ships than the British and Americans. But most of all, it was the buildup of exclusionary policies in the United States and the final Exclusion Laws prohibiting Japanese immigration in 1924 that galled Japanese nationalists. In their view, Asian civilization did not exhibit inhuman racist attitudes and policies of this kind, and for [Japanese] militants . . . these ingrained civilizational differences would have to be fought out in a final, righteous war of the East against the West.

According to certain information, the United States State Department, through its ambassadors, notified the governments of Latin American countries that they can expect changes in the situation in the Caribbean basin ‘if Castro’s government does not come to its senses.’ More probably, in the near future the United States, using the pretext of an allegedly growing threat to the Western Hemisphere, will embark on a long process of increasing the pressure on governments of the Latin American countries to work out additional sanctions against Cuba. One can also assume that the most wildly aggressive powers in the United States (the Pentagon, Cuban dissidents, and others) will continue to exert pressure on President Kennedy in order to realize the most decisive actions against Cuba.

The Cuban leadership believes, however, that the main guarantee of the development of the Cuban Revolution under conditions of possible direct American aggression is the readiness of the Soviet government to provide military assistance to Cuba.